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Race, "National Security," and
Unintended Consequences: A Sideways Glance at
Brown v. Board of Education at Fifty
Mark K. Moller*

I. INTRODUCTION

This year is not only the fiftieth anniversary of Brown v. Board of
Education,1 it is also the fiftieth anniversary of scholarly complaints
about Brown v. Board of Education. Almost from the date that the
Court decided Brown, critics--while rightly celebrating the outcome of
Brown-have excoriated the Warren Court for using ad hoc policy
rather than neutral legal principles to defend Brown's holding.2 While
Brown, the decision, has received a large share of well-founded and
appropriate anniversary praise on its fiftieth birthday, the half-centurylong scholarly tradition of Brown criticism has not received equal time
in the spotlight. This article seeks to remedy that oversight.
Rather than rehash all of the formalist arguments against the Brown
Court's analysis, this article will instead highlight a vein of criticism
absent from early commentary on Brown: criticism based on the law of
unintended consequences. One advantage of traditional legal method is
predictability: Disciplined judicial use of analogy, articulation of formal
tests, and definition of boundaries help to cabin and guide judicial
discretion, and to limit the effects of an opinion to a particular class of
cases and/or fact patterns. 3 In Brown, however, the Warren Court
* Senior Fellow in Constitutional Studies, The Cato Institute. I would like to thank Maria
Kanemitsu for helpful comments, and Elizabeth Kreul-Starr, Jacinda Lanum and Henry
Thompson for research assistance.
1. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Herbert Wechsler, for instance, declared Brown an abandonment of "neutral principles."
Herbert Weschsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1,
26-33 (1959). Weschsler argued that Brown should have been decided on freedom of
association, rather than equal protection, grounds. Id. at 34-35. Learned Hand declared the
decision "wrong," and an illegitimate "coup de main." LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS
54-55 (1962).
3. See Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1455, 1466-70 (1995)
(discussing the desirability and utility of judicial opinions that provide guidance for future
application by creating rules and explaining the reasoning underlying decisions).

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 36

abandoned those traditional tools of legal method. 4 Yet, the Brown
decision entailed such radically and unassailably positive consequences
that there seemed to be little room for suggesting that Brown's policybased decision-making could carry any negative, much less unexpected,
effects.
The Supreme Court's decision in Grutter v. Bollinger,5 which upheld
race-conscious admissions at the University of Michigan Law School
under the Equal Protection Clause, suggests that the unintended
consequences of policy-based equal protection jurisprudence of Brown
may merit a second look. Grutter is not only among the most policyoriented equal protection decisions rendered by the Supreme Court
since Brown, but nearly one year after the Grutter decision, it is evident
that a creative and unexpected policy rationale advanced by the Grutter
majority-"national security"-is susceptible to extension in ways that
threaten clear and present risks to academic freedom under the First
Amendment. 6 Grutter, accordingly, provides a timely opportunity for a
side-ways look at "Brown at Fifty," and suggests that the policy-based
methodology that the Brown Court employed and legitimated can entail
tangible, unexpected costs for the rule of law.
Part II begins the analysis by defining Brown's "policy"-based
method of decision-making. Part III.A examines Grutter's policy-based
justification for the University of Michigan Law School's raceconscious admissions program. Part III.B examines Grutter's "national
security" rationale for race-based law school admissions, and how that
rationale poses a threat to the scope of university freedom to regulate
campus speech. Finally, Part IV briefly suggests that, fifty years after
Brown, universities and minorities would be better off if the Court
devised principled legal rules, rather than unpredictable "policy"
rationales, to explain and extend Brown and to safeguard individual
rights under the Equal Protection Clause.
4. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95 (relying on the detrimental effects segregation imposes upon
African-Americans in holding that segregation is unconstitutional). See also Part II infra.
5. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
6. "Academic freedom" has been defined as a "special concern" of the First Amendment by
the Court. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1997)
(discussing academic freedom and the importance of exposing students to diverse ideas in the
development of the Nation's future leadership); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250
(1957) (explaining the essentiality of ensuring that free inquiry, study, and discussion in the
classroom, without interference, are protected in order to promote a democratic society and the
constitutional rights afforded to individuals). In this article, I use "academic freedom" to refer,
interchangeably, to both the "independent and uninhibited exchange of ideas among teachers and
students," free from external government oversight or regulation, as well as "autonomous
decisionmaking by the academy itself." See Regents of the Univ. of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S.
214, 226 n.12 (1985) (setting forth dual components of academic freedom).
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II. A DEFINITIONAL NOTE ON "POLICY" IN
BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION
This article criticizes Brown v. Board of Education's "policy"-based
approach to equal protection jurisprudence, and will suggest that the
Grutter decision provides some evidence that this methodology
risks-if does not inevitably lead to-negative unintended
consequences for parallel rights regimes. 7 Before discussing Grutter, it
may be worth briefly sketching what it means to say Brown is a
"policy"-based decision.
The dichotomy between "law" and "policy" is such a staple of nutsand-bolts legal thinking, that it may not be much of a stretch to venture
that the dichotomy is reflexively and intuitively familiar to many, if not
most, practicing lawyers and to judges (or at least, those judges who
once practiced law). However, the distinction is often criticized as
illusory in the academy, 8 and, for some academics, the use of the word
"policy" in a pejorative sense may simply be confusing. This short
analysis does not intend to venture into the abstruse, metaphysical
debate over whether law, at some philosophical level, can be
distinguished from "policy." Rather, my analysis uses "policy" in the
unsophisticated, meat-and-potatoes, practitioning sense of the word: in
other words, to refer to a reason for decision based on naked empirical
claims-the kind of claims that legislators or administrators without law
degrees typically make in support of legislation or rule-making- about
the effect of a decision on the outside world, unfiltered by the rigor of
the technical, distinctively lawyerly, analysis. By lawyerly analysis, I
mean analysis that is filtered through close, fact-sensitive readings of
previous, authoritative cases, use of tight analogical justifications,
and-where statutes or constitutions are at issue-close textual
readings, guided by traditional canons of interpretation.
7. By "parallel rights regimes," I mean constitutional rights that are textually and doctrinally
separate from equal protection. Parallel also gestures to the fact that there are some doctrinal
similarities in equal protection and free speech -including exceptions based on compelling or
substantial state interest and narrow tailoring.
8. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Selective Judicial Activism in the Equal Protection Context:
Democracy, Distrust, and Deconstruction, 73 GEO. L.J. 89, 99 (1984). Sherry states that:
A brief criticism of the most extreme version of the substance model, the
"deconstructionist" approach of some members of the critical legal studies movement,
illustrates the defects of the model .... The basic premise ... is that texts -including
the Constitution- are inherently indeterminate and that any interpretation is therefore
as permissible as any other.
Id. Cf. Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes
and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 191 (1987) (explaining that "the rejection of
formalism as a method of statutory interpretation doesn't condemn us to universal skepticism
about the possibility of interpretation").
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A seminal precedent on statutory construction-Alexander v.
Sandoval9 -helps to illustrate the meaning of "policy" in this roughand-ready, lawyerly sense. In Sandoval, plaintiffs asked the Court to
determine whether a statute-Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964--created a private right of action to enforce certain Department of
Justice regulations.l° Plaintiff contended a private right of action would
further the "purpose" of Title VI, by creating more enforcement
mechanisms for targeting discrimination.1 1 The Court did not accept
that rationale. When courts "imply" causes of actions based on
speculation about how to advance the "purpose" of legislators, or based
on speculation about Congress's "expectations" and/or the
"contemporary legal context" of the statute, stressed Sandoval, courts
violate the cardinal rule that "courts may not create [a cause of action],
no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how
compatible with the statute." 12 Instead, said Sandoval, courts must look
at a low level of
to concrete legal sources of decision-making, defined
13
specificity-i.e., the "text and structure of Title VI."
Sandoval, by equating policy with diffuse, generalized claims about
what is desirable, illuminates the meaning of "policy," as used in this
short analysis of Brown and Grutter: A "policy rationale," used here, is
the broad, diffuse consideration of "desirable" empirical
outcomes - defined at a high level of abstraction - as a judicial basis for
decision.
Brown v. Board of Education is a "policy"-based decision in the
humble, practitioning sense of the word used by the Court in Sandoval.
Brown eschews traditional legal analysis as a basis for decision. The
Brown Court engaged in no analysis of the text, structure, or history of
the Equal Protection Clause. Indeed, the Court called all of those
sources "inconclusive." 14 The Brown Court similarly suggested that
Instead-much like the
governing precedent was inconclusive. 15
9. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
10. Id.at 279.
11. Id. at 287.
Respondents would have us revert in this case to the understanding of private causes of
action that held sway 40 years ago when Title VI was enacted. That understanding is
captured by the ... statement ... that 'it is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide
such remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose' expressed
by a statute.
Id. (quoting JI. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1955).
12. Id. at 286-88 (emphasis added).
13. Id. at 288.
14. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954).
15. Id. at 492.
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plaintiffs in Sandoval-the Brown Court rested its decision almost
entirely on empirical claims about the real world importance and effects
of education: including, at the most abstract, reference to the
"importance of education to our democratic society" and to "service in
the armed forces," as well as the role of education in "awakening ...
children to cultural values," and to promoting "later professional
Based on social science suggesting that segregated
training."16
education degrades the self-esteem, and therefore educational
performance, of African-American children, the Court concluded that
segregation degraded these state interests, and therefore violated the
Equal Protection Clause. 17
In other words, Brown does not look very much like a technical,
lawyerly opinion. Rather, Brown looks very much like an example of
the kind of opinion the Sandoval Court characterizes as "policy"-based:
the decision of a case based simply on a set of "desirable" empirical
goals (in Brown, boosting the educational productivity of AfricanAmerican children and therefore promoting their participation in our
democratic society), without seeking independent support based on the
text and structure of the 8legal authority interpreted (in this case, the
1
Equal Protection Clause).
III. GRUTTER V. BOLLINGER AND THE DANGERS OF POLICY-BASED EQUAL
PROTECTION JURISPRUDENCE: A CASE STUDY

The policy-based equal protection analysis of Brown carries a risk of
unintended consequences for parallel right regimes. I am not claiming
this risk arises in every case: I am simply claiming that it can arise, and
that this risk should be taken into account when critically assessing the
methodology of Brown. Evidence for this proposition is found in
Grutter v. Bollinger, and, in particular, in the way a policy justification
for affirmative action offered in that case ("national security") has been
interpreted and applied since Grutter was decided.

16. Id.at 493.
17. Id.at494&n.ll,495.
18. Note that I do not mean to suggest the outcome in Brown -i.e. the end of racial
segregation in education-was incorrect as a matter of law: To the contrary, I believe Brown was
rightly decided. I am criticizing the decision at a technical, lawyerly level, by focusing on the
methodology of the written opinion, and the way in which the court reasoned to the
conclusion-not the ultimate, clearly correct, outcome of the case. The Equal Protection Clause
of the United States Constitution, incidentally, provides that no state may "deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 36

A. Policy in Grutter v. Bollinger
Grutter v. Bollinger19 may number among the most policy-based (in
the practitioning sense of the word) equal protection decisions since the
Court decided Brown v. Board of Education fifty years ago. Grutter
involved a challenge to the University of Michigan Law School's
admissions program. 20 That program awarded individual minority
applicants a "plus" in the competition for admission, based solely on
those applicants' membership in a designated racial group. 2' A White
student, Barbara Grutter, who had been denied admission to the
University of Michigan Law School, sued. She alleged that the Law
School's admissions system impermissibly discriminated on the basis of
race. 22 In a 5-4 decision eagerly anticipated across the political
spectrum, the Supreme Court upheld the Law School's admissions
23
program.
In the course of so holding, Justice O'Connor effectively abandoned
prior precedent as a meaningful restraint on judicial discretion. 24 First,
Justice 0' Connor declared Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke 25 and the rules governing its interpretation to be
inconclusive-or, more precisely, "fractured," "bafffling]," and "more
easily stated than applied.",26 At the same time, Justice O'Connor
19. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
20. Id. at 31617.
21. Id. at 321.
22. Id. at 316-17. She alleged that the university violated the Fourteenth Amendment when it
used race to give certain minority applicants "a significantly greater chance of admission than
students with similar credentials from disfavored racial groups," and "had no compelling interest
to justify their use of race in the admission process." Id.
23. Id. at 343-44.
24. The policy-based method of decision-making on display in the Grutter majority opinion
has been analyzed, comprehensively and in detail, elsewhere. See generally Roger Pilon,
Principleand Policy in Public University Admissions, 2002-2003 CATO SUP. CT. REv. 43 (2003)
(criticizing Grutter as an unprincipled, policy-based departure from the constitutional principle of
equality).
25. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). In Bakke, the Court found an
admissions program at the university's Medical School unconstitutional, but held that a university
could consider race as part of the admissions process if it was factored in as part of the
competitive process with other characteristics. Id. at 276, 317-18. Bakke was a White male
applicant to the Medical School who sued the university after he was denied admission despite
the fact that his Medical Collage Admissions Test ("MCAT") scores, grade point average, and
benchmark scores were significantly higher than several applicants whom were admitted. Id. at
277.
26. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325 ("In the wake of our fractured decision in Bakke, courts have
struggled to discern whether Justice Powell's diversity rationale, set forth in part of the opinion
joined by no other Justice, is nonetheless binding precedent"). The Court noted that the test for
assessing the "holding" in a fragmented decision should be disregarded because it has "so
obviously baffled and divided the lower courts that have considered it." Id.
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effectively eviscerated "strict scrutiny" as a meaningful, rule-like
presumption against racial classifications. Rather than articulate the
strict scrutiny standard in a constraining way, Justice O'Connor's
opinion collapsed the legal presumption against racial classification into
a diffuse and manipulable investigation of Sandoval-like policy
concerns: the "context" in which 27racial classifications are used, and the
"purpose" of such classifications.
In particular, the majority opinion purported to canvass the needs and
interests of the nation's grey-flannel American elites, including top
corporate executives, national politicians, and perhaps most
unexpectedly, top military brass and Pentagon officials in the Reagan,
Based on the purported
Bush I, and Clinton administrations. 28
recruiting needs of these elites, the majority contended that integrated
education advances a distinctly abstract and nationalist set of goals,
including the nation's interest in productive "work" in a "global
marketplace"; the nation's need for persons suited to serve as
legislators, executive branch officials, and judges for an increasingly
multicultural population; and the nation's overarching need for topflight "training" grounds for "our Nation's leaders." 29 The Court ruled
that the traditional presumption against racial classifications in
educational admissions may yield to our "national" interest in furthering
27. Id. at 327 (asserting that "[clontext matters.... [niot every decision influenced by race is
equally objectionable, and strict scrutiny is designed to provide a framework for carefully
examining the importance and the sincerity of the reasons advanced by the governmental
decisionmaker for the use of race in that particular context"). Cf.Alexander, 532 U.S. at 287-88
(equating focus on "purpose" and "context" with "policy").
28. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330-31 (citing Brief of Amicus Curiae 3M, et al.and Brief of
Amicus Curiae General Motors Corp., Grutter v. Bollinger, 538 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241,
02-516) (discussing the recruiting needs of large corporate employers)); id. at 331 (citing
Consolidated Brief of Amici Curiae Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. in Support of
Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 538 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241, 02-516) (discussing needs
of military recruitment)); id. at 332 (citing Brief of Amicus Curiae Association of American Law
Schools, Grutter v. Bollinger, 538 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241, 02-516) (noting that
"[i]ndividuals with law degrees occupy roughly half the state governorships, more than half the
seats in the United States Senate, and more than a third of the seats in the United States House of
Representatives")).
29. Id. at 330-32. See id. at 330 ("[Mlajor American businesses have made clear that the
skills needed in today's increasingly global marketplace can only be developed through exposure
to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints"). See also id. at 331 ("We have
repeatedly acknowledged the overriding importance of preparing students for work and
citizenship, describing education as pivotal to 'sustaining our political and cultural heritage' with
a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of society" (quoting Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629,
634 (1950))); id. at 332 ("[U]niversities, and in particular, law schools, represent the training
ground for a large number of our Nation's leaders"). These interests find exact parallels in
Brown's policy discussion. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (citing the
role that education plays in furthering participation in democratic society, "service in the armed
forces," "citizenship," and "professional training").
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these diffuse goals, at least in cases where race is used "flexibly as a
'plus' factor in the context of individualized consideration of each and
30
every applicant."
B. Grutter's Unintended Consequences
In the course of articulating the governing policy concerns, the
Grutter majority lavished attention on an unexpected policy rationale:
"national security." Of all the policy rationales advanced by the Grutter
majority, this policy rationale may well prove to be the most difficult to
cabin. Indeed, in the year since the Court decided Grutter, the Grutter
"national security" rationale has recurred in contexts that are far
removed from race-based equal protection, in postures that risk negative
effects for academic freedom and, in some cases, equal protection.
1. The Grutter "National Security" Rationale
The Grutter "national security" rationale has roots in a somewhat
improbable amicus brief. 31 Recognizing that the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks and the Bush Administration's ongoing war against
Iraq 32 rendered appeals to "national security" compelling and salient,
the University of Michigan's legal team tied the Michigan affirmative
action program to national defense and military preparedness. Toward
that end, the University authorized a host of ex-military and exPentagon officials, including Robert "Bud" McFarlane, the Reagan-era
architect of the Iran-Contra scandal, and Norman Schwartzkopf, the
first Iraq war, to weigh in before the
commander of U.S. forces in the
33
Supreme Court as amici curiae.
The resulting military brief asked the Court to uphold the
University's affirmative action program as an essential prop for an
effective and "battle-ready" military. 34 First, the brief rehashed the
30. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 (citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315-16
(1978)).
31. Consolidated Brief of Amici Curiae Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr., et al. at 1, Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241, 02-516) [hereinafter Military Brief].
32. Oral arguments in Grutter were heard on April 1, 2003-less than two weeks after the
commencement of the American march on Baghdad. Oral Argument Tr., Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), available at 2003 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 26. The Court decided
Grutter on June 23, 2003, eight weeks after President Bush announced the cessation of major
combat operations against Saddam Hussein's regime. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306. President Bush
declared an end to major combat operations on May 1, 2003. Michael Tackett, Bush: Iraq War
Won, CHI. TRIB., May 2, 2003, at 1.
33. Military Brief, supra note 31, at 1-4. For an account of the genesis of the Grutter Military
Brief, see Jonathan Groner, In Grutter v. Bollinger Amicus Avalanche, One Brief Stood Out,
LEGAL TIMES, July 2,2003, availableat http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1056139919083.
34. Military Brief, supra note 31, at 27.
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morale problems, leadership problems and unit cohesion problems of
the Vietnam-era military:
In the 1960s and 1970s ... while integration increased the percentage

of African-Americans in the enlisted ranks, the percentage of minority
officers remained extremely low ... The danger this created was not
theoretical ... As that war continued, the armed forces suffered

increased racial polarization, pervasive disciplinary problems, and
racially motivated incidents .... 35
Second, the brief emphasized that "national security" is a paramount
government interest, transcending even equal protection: "It is obvious
and unarguable that no governmental interest is more compelling than
the security of the Nation." 36 After detailing the efforts to ensure that
elite military service academies are racially inclusive, 37 the brief made a
startling leap. The brief concluded that if "national security" requires
that service academies must be "diverse," it is a "small step" to
conclude that civilian universities, from which the military draws
ROTC recruits and civilian leaders of the military, must guarantee racial
and "viewpoint" diversity on campus if the military is to remain
effective: "[O]ur country's other most selective institutions must remain
both diverse and selective," argued the brief,38 because our "military
security," "economic security," and "international competitiveness
39
depend upon it."

To say that the Court found the brief persuasive would be an
understatement. Although the Grutter Court received more than one
hundred different amicus briefs for or against the University of
Michigan, 4° including briefs submitted by members of Congress, 41 the

35. Id.at 6.
36. Id. at 7 (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981)).
37. Id. at 10-26.
38. Id. at 29-30.
39. Id. at 29-30.
40. Brendan I. Koerner, Do Judges Read Amicus Curiae Briefs?, at http://slate.msn.com/id/
2081006 (Apr. 1, 2003).
41. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Rep. Richard A. Gephardt, et al., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241, 02-516) (noting that Congressman Gephart was a 1965 graduate of
the University of Michigan Law School and that there was only one minority graduate that year,
namely the Honorable Harry T. Edwards of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia; and also arguing that diversity in higher education is a compelling governmental
interest and that the University's admissions policies are narrowly tailored to meet that interest);
Brief of Amici Curiae John Conyers, Jr., et al., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos.
02-241, 02-516) (arguing that racial diversity in higher education strengthens American
democracy); Brief of Amici Curiae Senators Thomas A. Daschle, et al., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241, 02-516) (supporting adherence to Justice Powell's opinion in
Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)).
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NAACP, 42 the United Negro College Fund,4 3 the Anti-Defamation
League, 44 and the Governors and State Attorneys General of several
states, 45 the justices repeatedly singled out the military brief during oral
argument. 46 The Court bent over backwards to accommodate the brief.
Thus, although counsel for the appellants argued, with some merit, that
the military brief raised factual questions outside the scope of the record
on appeal,47 the Court brushed aside the limitations of the factual record
in order to incorporate the military brief in the final decision. 48 The
Court's ultimate decision upholding the Michigan Law admissions
to the military brief than to any other
program contained more cites
49
brief submitted to the Court.

42. Brief of Amici Curiae the NAACP, et al., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos.
02-241, 02-516) (arguing that race-sensitive admissions policies further the goals of diminishing
the effects of racial segregation and preserving higher education opportunities for AfricanAmericans).
43. Brief of Amici Curiae the United Negro College Fund and Kappa Alpha Psi, Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241, 02-516) (arguing that race-conscious admissions
combat the historical exclusion of African-Americans from the nation's traditionally White
educational institutions).
44. Brief of Amicus Curiae the Anti-Defamation League, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306
(2003) (Nos. 02-241, 02-516) (arguing that the University of Michigan undergraduate and law
school admissions systems violate the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI).
45. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Michigan Governor Jennifer M. Granholm, Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241, 02-516) (arguing that the First Amendment affords
universities the institutional autonomy to advance their educational missions by achieving a
diverse student body); Brief of Amicus Curiae the State of Florida and the Honorable John Ellis
"Jeb" Bush, Governor, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241, 02-516)
(illustrating how Florida's State University system has achieved diversity by race-neutral means);
Brief of Amici Curiae the States of Alabama, et al., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)
(Nos. 02-241, 02-516) (urging the Court to create uniformity among the states in administering
the admissions processes of their institutions of higher education).
46. Oral Argument Tr. at 5-10, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241),
available at 2003 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 26.
47. Id. at 6-8.
48. See id. at 5-7 (quoting from the oral argument). Questioning proceeded as follows:
Question: [M]ay I call your attention ... to the brief that was filed on behalf of some
retired military officers who said that to have an officer corps that includes minority
members in any number, there is no way to do it other than to give not an overriding
preference, but a plus for race....
Mr. Kolbo: Justice Ginsberg, I don't believe we have an adequate record in this case
from which to conclude that we wouldn't have representation of minorities.
Question: [N]onetheless even if it's true that there will be very few, if any, minority
members admitted to the military academies, still you cannot use race?
Id.
49. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 308, 331 (citing the military brief six times). The brief also received
significant media attention. See, e.g., Sylvia H. Walbot & Joseph H. Lang, Jr., Amicus Briefs
Revisited, 33 STETSON L. REv. 171, 173-75 (2003) (discussing media coverage of the military
brief).
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In the end, the Grutter majority took an expansive view of the
arguments presented by the military brief, agreeing with the military
brief that "national security" is a "real" and "compelling" government
interest that justifies race conscious law school admissions.5 ° While,
during oral argument, questioning focused on the "national security"
implications of the admissions criteria used at military service
academies, 51 the Grutter majority opinion articulated a "national
security" rationale for the Court's decision that reached beyond the
narrow province of service academy admissions: "[N]ational security,"
concluded Justice O'Connor, requires that not only service academies
but all of the "most selective institutions [of higher education],"
including law schools and other civilian "training ground[s]" for
diverse if the military is to "fulfill its
leaders, "must remain" ethnically
52
principle [sic] mission."
2.

The Trouble with "National Security"

The Grutter majority paid lip service to notions of academic
freedom. 53 However, scrutiny of Justice O'Connor's majority decision
suggests that Grutter's implications for academic freedom are clouded,
at best. In particular, the "national security" policy arguments in
Grutter may well prove to be a defeat for academic freedom in the long
run, by lowering the bar for government assertions of power to regulate
speech on campus based on "compelling" "national security" interests.
a. Grutter'sThreat to Academic Freedom
To see why Grutter poses a threat to academic freedom, three facets
of the Grutter Court's basis for upholding the Michigan admissions
system bear closer scrutiny: (1) the Court's focus on speech; (2) the
Court's use of peremptory language to describe the requirements of
"national security"; and (3) the attenuated causal nexus between the
50. Grutter,539 U.S. at 331.
51. Oral Argument Tr. at 6-7, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241),
available at 2003 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 26.
52. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331-32 (emphasis added). The Court appeared to extend the
"national security" rationale to civilian institutions for two reasons: (1) because civilian
universities are training grounds for ROTC officers; and (2) because elite universities are most
likely to produce civilian commanders of the military (i.e., Department of Defense officials). Id.
The brief also strongly implied that the role of institutions of higher education are analogous to
the role of service academies in the military: just as a diverse officer corps helps to legitimize
military officers and promote unit cohesion, said the Court, so too does a diverse civilian elite
help to legitimize civilian "leaders" and promote national cohesion in times of crisis. Id.
53. Id. at 329 ("We have long recognized that, given the important purpose of public
education and the expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university
environment, universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition").
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asserted "national security" interest and Michigan Law admissions
program.
i. Speech
The Grutter majority took pains to emphasize that Michigan's raceconscious admission system survived "strict scrutiny" under the Equal
Protection Clause because that admission system served to regulate the
contribution to and distribution of campus speech. Specifically, the
Grutter majority explained that the Michigan system used race as a
proxy for expanding "exposure [of students] to widely diverse ...
cultures, ideas, and viewpoints." 54 Grutter emphasized that this speechrelated component of the admissions program helped to make the
Michigan admissions system more palatable under the Equal Protection
Clause. Citing Justice Powell's concurrence in Bakke, the Court
emphasized that equal protection is less offended where the university's
use of race is not an end in itself, but rather is the means for furthering
an "institutional mission" that transcends race: namely, the promotion
of a "'robust exchange of ideas." 55 In short, the Michigan admissions
program survived scrutiny in part
because that program is designed to
56
promote "viewpoint" diversity.
The Court's focus on "viewpoint" diversity renders Grutter's
invocation of "national security" troublesome for the protection of
academic freedom from arbitrary state incursion. Prior to Grutter, the
Court suggested that "national security" interests might entitle the
government to infringe on academic freedom in some narrow contexts;
for instance, imposing publication restraints on university professors
who conduct classified scientific research for the government. 57 Until
Grutter, however, the inviolability of the student exchange of ideas
within an academic setting from government oversight or regulation
seemed sacrosanct. 58 By simultaneously lauding racial diversity as a
54. Id. at 330.
55. Id. at 329.
56. See id. at 333 (concluding that because "growing up in a particular region or having
particular professional experiences is likely to affect an individual's views, so too is one's own
unique experience of being a racial minority"; therefore, a "'critical mass' of underrepresented
minorities is necessary to further its compelling interest in securing the educational benefits of a
diverse student body") (emphasis added).
57. See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 (1980) (holding that "national
security" provides a compelling interest in restraining disclosure of classified information in a
published article by an ex-CIA agent).
58. See J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First Amendment," 99
YALE L.J. 251, 311 (1989) (arguing that "the Supreme Court's decisions concerning academic
freedom have protected principally and expressly a First Amendment right of the university
itself-understood in its corporate capacity-largely to be free from government interference in
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means of exposing students to diverse "ideas" and asserting that the
government has a compelling "national security" interest in the
promotion of racial diversity, the Grutter majority opinion could be read
to suggest the government has a "national security" interest in both: (1)
the distribution of viewpoints on campus; and (2) most alarmingly, in
use to regulate student exposure
the tools that university administrators
59
to viewpoints on campus.
To be sure, Grutter's national security rationale focuses on the need
for a racially diverse officer corps, and so could be read to simply
suggest that the military functions better when there are more AfricanAmerican officers. But the Grutter opinion pervasively conflates
exposure to diversity with pedagogy by suggesting that diversity has a
positive educational effect on the minds of non-minority students, and
by fostering robust exchange of ideas, and therefore sensitivity to
different outlooks. 60 Given that acclaim for the pedagogical role of
diversity pervades the opinion, it is just as plausible that Grutter's
suggestion that makes "diversity" a "must" for civilian universities 61 to
promote diversity is based, at least in part, on the supposition that
diversity in an educational setting where the military recruits officers
will also help make White officers better commanders of a racially
diverse military by making those officers more sensitive to the views
and outlook of soldiers from a different ethnic background.
ii. Peremptory Language
The Grutter majority articulated the "national security" rationale
using peremptory language that is in tension with any asserted
university claims to meaningful administrative independence. That
peremptory tone had been set by the military brief. While the
University of Michigan Law School cast its argument as a plea for
deference to university judgment, the military brief contained little
discussion of the degree of deference owed to a university. Instead, the
brief emphasized that "national security" is a paramount government
interest, external to the goals of the university, that transcends not only
the individualized constitutional protections of the Equal Protection
the performance of core educational functions"); id. at 330 (asserting that "[c]onstitutional
academic freedom can perhaps best be seen as a principle that regulation should not proceed so
far as to deprive the university of control over its academic destiny").
59. Here, of course, the tool used is an admission program designed to promote a critical mass
of minority students, who (so the Court's reasoning goes) presumptively will help to contribute to
a "robust exchange of ideas" on campus. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329.
60. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text (discussing the policy conclusion that a
diverse student body exposes students to a wider range of ideas and viewpoints).
61. Grutter,539 U.S. at 331-32.
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Clause, but also all other asserted government interests, including,
62
presumably, the freedom of public universities to self-regulate.
Consistent with that premise, the brief framed its argument in
mandatory terms, arguing that "diversity in higher education" is
"essential to ensuring an effective, battle-ready fighting force," 63 that
the threat posed64by racial stratification of the "nation's . . . leaders" is
"unacceptable,
and that the interests of "national security" allow for
no alternative to the kind of program adopted by the University of
Michigan Law School.65 Most revealingly, the brief, as a basis for its
argument in favor of government power to regulate campus diversity,
invoked Haig v. Agee 66 - the landmark (and much criticized) First
Amendment precedent that upheld the government's "unarguable"
power to regulate speech (not race) based on compelling "national
security" interests, in 67spite of default First Amendment protection
against such regulation.
Grutter's discussion of the "national security" rationale echoed the
peremptory tones of the military brief. The Court stated that the
government's asserted "national security" interest is "not theoretical but
real,' 68 that diversity is "essential" to "national security ' 69 and that elite
institutions "must remain ... diverse" if the military is to "fulfill its
mission." 70 The language of the Grutter majority opinion is not
language of deference to university administrators, but of command.
62. See Military Brief, supra note 31, at 27 (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981)
("It is obvious and unarguable that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security
of the Nation.")).
63. Id. at 27.
64. Id. at 28 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312-13 (1978)
(Powell, J., concurring). "[T]he nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide
exposure to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples." Id.
Further noting that the "threat" to military cohesion posed by unintegrated officers corps in the
1960s and 1970s was "so dangerous and unacceptable that it resulted in immediate and dramatic
changes" intended to restore racial balance." Id.
65. Id. at 29 ("There is presently no workable alternative to limited, race-conscious programs
to increase the pool of qualified minority officer candidates and establish diverse educational
settings for officer candidates.").
66. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
67. See Millitary Brief, supra note 31, at 27 (quoting Haig, 453 U.S. at 307, which states that
"[ilt is obvious and unarguable that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security
of the Nation"); see also Sanford Levinson, What is the Constitution's Role in Wartime?: Why
Free Speech and Other Rights Are Not as Safe as You Might Think, FIND LAW, at
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20011017_levinson.html (Oct. 17, 2001) (criticizing
Haig in its implication that "all bets are off with regard to the courts offering genuine protection
of civil liberties during time of war").
68. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330-31 (2003) (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 331 (emphasis added).
70. Id. at 331 (quoting Military Brief, supra note 31, at 29) (emphasis added).
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iii. Attenuated Causal Nexus
Finally, and perhaps most alarmingly, the Grutter majority opinion,
on one reading, suggests an especially loose and attenuated causal nexus
between "national security" and the University of Michigan Law School
admissions program. Prior to Grutter, the Court had labored to cabin
the circumstances in which the government may rely on a "compelling"
"national security" interest to regulate protected speech, by requiring a
fairly tight causal nexus between the conduct regulated and the asserted
security risk. In New York Times v. United States ("The Pentagon
Papers Case"),7 for instance, Justice Brennan suggested that "only
governmental allegation and proof that [speech] must inevitably,
directly, and immediately" threaten "national security" could provide a
sufficiently "compelling" basis for overcoming the constitutional
Since The
presumption against state regulation of expression. 72
Pentagon Papers Case, the Court has upheld "national security" as a
basis for intrusion on speech only in those narrow circumstances, in
which the speech poses a direct and proximate threat to security. That
nexus has been met in cases involving disclosure of classified
information.73 Similarly, in Haig v. Agee,74 the Court confronted a
campaign conducted by a former Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA")
employee "to expose CIA officers and agents," 75 and held that this
particular conduct constituted a sufficiently compelling threat to
security to justify government regulation of speech.76
Grutter, by contrast, is suggestive of a far more attenuated
"compelling" "national security" interest in speech. Assuming that the
Grutter majority viewed diversity as a pedagogical benefit for White
officers, the "national security" interest in Grutter is not a direct interest
in particularized speech, such as publication of a sensitive document or
disclosure of classified information, but an indirect interest in the
general distribution of viewpoints on campuses where the military may
71. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
72. Id. at 726-27 (Brennan, J., concurring). In the Pentagon Papers Case, the Nixon
administration attempted to suppress a New York Times reporter's disclosure, in the press, of
classified information about the extent of United States involvement in the Vietnam War, based
on a putative "national security" interest in the secrecy of that information. Id. at 714 (per
curiam). The Court held that the interest in keeping that information secret was not sufficiently
compelling to justify infringing on the free speech rights of the media. Id.
73. See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509-13 (1980).
74. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
75. Id. at 283.
76. Id. at 308-09 (holding employee's disclosures are "clearly not protected by the
Constitution" since they "have the declared purpose of obstructing intelligence operations and the
recruiting of intelligence personnel").
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Second, the link between the distribution of
recruit officers.
at the University of Michigan Law School and
diversity
"viewpoint"
"national security" interest is itself strained: Given that the vast majority
of Michigan Law Students are unlikely to serve in the military or even
in ROTC, it is hard to argue with a straight face that the distribution of
viewpoints at "elite" civilian law schools and the "national security"
military is direct or immediate in the sense
interest in an effective
77
illustrated by Haig.
In short, Grutter: (1) implies the government has an interest in the
distribution of academic speech; and (2) expressly states that this
government interest is "compelling" in a constitutionally important
sense because that interest implicates "national security."
Given that the causal relationship between speech and "compelling"
"national security" interests in Grutter is far more attenuated than that
recognized as constitutionally important in other cases, Grutter has
nudged the Court closer to a recognition that "national security" limits
university autonomy over the campus marketplace of ideas.
To be sure, Grutter is an equal protection-and not a First
Amendment-case, and therefore is not a direct First Amendment
precedent. Yet, as the military brief's reliance on the First Amendment
case Haig illustrates, the recognition of a compelling state interest cuts
across the formal doctrinal boundaries that separate equal protection and
First Amendment law. 7 8 An interest that is sufficiently compelling to
unravel presumptions against race-based classifications under the Equal
Protection Clause may be sufficiently compelling to justify
compromising default constitutional protections under the First
Amendment. And a precedent in the free speech realm may serve as a
precedent in the equal protection realm-and vice versa.
Moreover, the connection between speech and "national security" is a
natural implication of an opinion that makes both "national security"
and "exchange of ideas" central to its justification for upholding
affirmative action. Indeed, regardless of the Court's intentions, the
Court's facial focus on the role of diversity as an educational tool-i.e.,
a tool for promoting greater understanding of and tolerance for different
77. See University of Michigan School of Law, Class of 2003 Graduate Employment
Statistics, at www.law.umich.edu/currentstudents/careerservices/prospectivestudents.htm (last
visited September 12, 2004) (showing that only a small fraction, if any, University of Michigan
Law School students obtain military employment). In 2003, sixty-one percent of University of
Michigan Law School graduates found employment in private practice, twenty-two percent found
employment in judicial clerkships, eleven percent found employment in government/public
interest, and six percent found employment in business and other. Id.
78. Military Brief, supra note 31, at 30.
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viewpoints-may color, for casual readers, the Court's reference to
national security. Put another way, by defining the concept of a
compelling national security interest downward, Grutter's holding desensitizes its readers to the notion that the government's "national
security" interests and the university's interest in promoting a "diverse"
marketplace of ideas may overlap or dovetail.7 9 Given that the Court
has to date struggled to maintain a firewall between national security
and education, that juxtaposition cannot be assumed to be benign.
b. The Threats Materialize
On the face of the opinion, it is possible to read Grutter as precedent
that supports-or at least de-sensitizes us toward- the proposition that
the state has an interest in the regulation of campus speech. The
question is this: Will creative litigants see the opportunity, and, if so,
how hard will they push? While it has been slightly over a year since
the Grutter decision, there is some preliminary evidence that the threat
is real and not simply hypothetical. The evidence comes in the form of:
(1) a case, Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. v.
Rumsfeld s° ("FAIR v. Rumsfeld"); and (2) a Congressional
initiative-the International Studies in Higher Education Act of
2003-a bill that is designed to use federal funding grants to increase
over the "diversity" of curricula in Middle East
government oversight
81
studies departments.
i.

Forum for Academic & InstitutionalRights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld

In FAIR v. Rumsfeld, litigants attempted to use Grutter as a weapon
to restrict, rather than expand, academic freedom. At issue in FAIR v.
Rumsfeld were the policies of a number of private law schools, which
sought to deny military recruiters equal access to on-campus job
These law schools believed that military
interview fairs. 82
79. Cf. Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026,
1090 (2003):
Judicial decisions, unlike many statutes, explicitly set forth their justifications, and
might therefore have more predictable attitude-altering effects. But people might still
interpret a decision as endorsing a certain justification even if that's not quite what the
decision held, partly because many people don't read court decisions very closely or
remember them precisely (again, because of rational ignorance).
Id.
80. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269,
282-83 (D.N.J. 2003) [hereinafter FAIR], overruled, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 24598 (3d Cir. Nov.
29, 2004); see also Brief for Appellants at 30-34, Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc. v.
Rumsfeld, No. 03-4433 (3d Cir. filed Jan. 5, 2004) [hereinafter FAIR Brief].
81. H.R. 3077, 108th Cong. (2003).
82. FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 282-83.
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discrimination against gay students offended the schools' voluntarily
adopted equal protection guidelines, which barred discriminatory
recruiters from access to campus facilities.8 3 The government, in turn,
threatened to withhold federal funding from law schools that
discriminate against the military, sparking litigation by several umbrella
organizations, individual law professors, and students, including the
Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights ("FAIR"), the Society for
as well as law professors Erwin Chemerinsky
American Law Teachers,
84
Law.
Sylvia
and
The FAIR plaintiffs argued that the government's coercive use of the
purse-string impermissibly infringed on private universities' freedom to
adopt voluntary anti-discrimination policies-in particular, "no
tolerance" policies against employer discrimination on the basis of
Round one of the litigation went to the
sexual orientation.8 5
government: the trial court, applying an intermediate scrutiny test under
the First Amendment, denied a preliminary injunction against the
government and held that the government has full power under the
Spending Clause to deny funding to schools that refuse equal entry to

83. See id. at 281 (stating that "[flaw schools are loathe to endorse or assist recruiting efforts
of the United States military because of its policy against homosexual activity").
84. Id. at 282 ("Plaintiffs allege that the DOD threatened law schools with the loss of not only
DOD funding, but all federal funding, if the schools did not afford the military full access to
career services, the students, and the law schools."). Law and Chemerinsky are among the named
plaintiffs in the case. Id. at 274. The basis for this threat is 10 U.S.C. § 983(b), also known as the
"Solomon Amendment." The Solomon Amendment, in pertinent part, provides:
Denial of funds for preventing military recruiting on campus. No funds described in
subsection (d)(2) may be provided by contract or by grant (including a grant of funds
to be available for student aid) to an institution of higher education (including any
subelement of such institution) if the Secretary of Defense determines that that
institution (or any subelement of that institution) has a policy or practice (regardless of
when implemented) that either prohibits, or in effect prevents the Secretary of a military department or Secretary of Homeland Security from
gaining entry to campuses, or access to students... on campuses, for purposes of
military recruiting; or access by military recruiters for purposes of military
recruiting to ... information pertaining to students ... enrolled at that institution
(or any subelement of that institution).
10 U.S.C. § 983(b) (2000 & West Supp. 2004), amended by Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 1704(B)(1),
(9), 116 Stat. 2314, 2316 (making the change effective on date of transfer of the Coast Guard to
the Department of Homeland Security, and striking the term "of transportation" and replacing it
with "of Homeland Security"). For more on academic criticism of the Solomon Amendment, see
American Association of University Professors, 2003-04 Legal Docket, at
http://www.aaup/Legal/Legal%20materials/legaldoc.htm (last visited June 15, 2004), and Society
of American Law Teachers, Justice Under Solomon, available at http://222.saltlaw.org/
justiceundersolomon.pdf (last visited June 15, 2004).
85. See FAIR Brief, supra note 80, at 30-34 (arguing government policy violates academic
freedom, freedom of speech and freedom of expressive association).
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military recruiters.
On appeal, at least one set of interested parties thought that Grutter
cuts in favor of the government. An amicus brief filed by veteran
students 87 (hereinafter "veterans' brief") reasoned that under Grutter, a
university's autonomy was limited where its assertion of institutional
freedom can be characterized as in tension both with "viewpoint"
diversity and "national security." Specifically, the brief argued that by
placing university prestige squarely against the military, the law schools
degraded the "viewpoint" diversity that Grutter held is essential to the
academic environment, by chilling speech of law student veterans, who
are "guilty by association. "88 In a nod to the "national security"
argument advanced by the Grutter majority, the brief further suggested
that Grutter's emphasis on the pedagogical value of "viewpoint"
diversity may take on special importance where national security is at
issue: "Veterans," argued the brief, "add value to law school classroom
discussions, particularly on matters relating to national security, foreign
89 "If
affairs, and other issues connected to America's armed forces."
the plaintiffs succeed ... law schools will lose part of the vibrancy and
that Grutter recognized is "so
diversity of the academic environment"
9
critical to law school success."
The brief's argument, while ultimately unsuccessful, underscored
three points: First, the veterans' brief illustrated that Grutter's analysis
of "diversity" is susceptible to an interpretation that focuses on the
implications of the case for speech. Second, the veterans' brief-by
attempting to strategically link Grutter's thematic emphasis on
viewpoint diversity and national security- suggested that those who
challenge university power to control the campus marketplace of ideas
may see Grutter as a weapon in cases where litigants can convince a
court that university autonomy simultaneously is at war with both
"viewpoint" diversity and "national security." 91 Third, by suggesting
that student access to veteran insight on "national security" affects the
value of "viewpoint" diversity, the veterans' brief pointed to a more
86. FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 310-14.
87. Brief of Amici Curiae the UCLaw Veterans Soc'y, Forum for Academic & Institutional
Rights v. Rumsfeld, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 24598 (3d Cir. Nov. 29, 2004) (No. 03-4433). The
brief was filed by law students currently serving in the military, military reserves or who have
previously served in the military. Id. at 1.
88. Id. at 26.
89. Id. at 25-26 (emphasis added).
90. Id. at 26 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331-32 (2003)).
91. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331 (quoting the Military Brief's statement that a "diverse officer
corps ... is essential to the military's ability to fulfill its principle mission to provide national
security").
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distant, but logical and troubling, implication of Grutter-namely, that
the government's interest in safeguarding military recruitment at elite
schools may entail a correlate interest in ensuring that elite law schools
are not unremittingly hostile to the military or military service.
Grutter's logic, after all, implicitly seems to point to the following
proposition: that the government has a "national security" interest in
"viewpoint" diversity on campus because: (1) the military depends on
civilian institutions of higher education for officer recruits; and (2) the
degree of recruits' exposure to race-and therefore "viewpoint
diversity"-on campus may affect recruitment effectiveness, by
harming the post-recruitment performance of those recruits once they
join the military. 92 Assuming the national security rationale in Grutter
is in part premised on the notion that diversity makes White officers
more effective in a multicultural military, by exposing them to diverse
viewpoints, then isn't the distribution of viewpoints that are directly
related to the value of military service equally, if not more, material to
"national security"? Surely exposure to viewpoints that favor service
are more directly related to the effectiveness of recruitment than the
more general distribution of "diverse" "ideas and viewpoints" for which
Grutter treats race as a proxy.
The veterans' brief in FAIR v. Rumsfeld, in short, suggested that
Grutter's precedential value is not necessarily confined to equal
protection-rendering that case's implications for speech not only
tangible, but also potentially troublesome.
ii. H.R. 3077: The International Studies in Higher Education Act
To the extent that academics have noticed the tension between
Grutter's "diversity" rationale and academic freedom, they perhaps
have been inclined to view the tension as benign. But it will not always
be so. Consider a bill currently before Congress, H.R. 3077, introduced
not long after Grutter was decided. 93
The bill would expand
Congressional power to scrutinize university curricula and to use the
federal funding power effectively to counterbalance disfavored
scholarship in federally funded scholarship programs. It is a nightmare
for academic freedom. Yet the bill is arguably on sounder legal and
conceptual footing after Grutter.
Members of the House of Representatives introduced H.R. 3077 last
year in an attempt to bolster recruitment of foreign language speakers
92. See supra notes 28-52 and accompanying text (discussing the arguments in the Military
Brief and the Court's reliance on the Military Brief).
93. H.R. 3077, 108th Cong. (2003). The bill was introduced on September 11, 2003. Id.
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94
and Middle East specialists for the security and intelligence services.
Specifically, the bill would provide new federal funding to foreign
studies programs, which the bill's sponsors believe are needed to train
more experts for government service in the diplomatic corps,
intelligence corps, and criminal agencies. 95 The stated goal of H.R.
3077 echoes the University of Michigan Law School's diversity-based
justifications for its admissions program: the bill states Congressional
intention to "increas[e] the participation of underrepresented
populations" in the diplomatic and intelligence corps, by strengthening
96
a "diverse network of undergraduate ... international studies centers."
The sponsors of the bill have stated that a key goal is to enhance
and Middle East
government recruitment of Arabic-language speakers
97
specialists in the wake of September 11, 200 1.
As an incident of federal funding, the bill would establish a
curriculum "advisory" board tasked with recommending-from a
"national security" standpoint- whether grant recipients ensure a proper
balance of diverse perspectives in university Middle-Eastern studies
programs. 98 Of the seven members of the proposed board, two would
represent "[flederal agencies that have national security responsibilities"
and three would be appointed directly by the majority and minority
leaders of the House. 99 Proponents of the board, including the Iraq
hawk Martin Kramer and conservative activist and Hoover Institute
fellow Stanley Kurtz, argue that Middle East studies programs must
include views less "anti-American," less influenced by "post-colonial

94. Id.
95. Press Release, Office of Congressman Pete Hoekstra, Hoekstra Bills to Strengthen
Graduate Education, International Studies Pass Committee, Head to House (Sept. 25, 2003),
available at http://www.house.gov/hoekstra/092503_2.html [hereinafter Hoekstra Press Release].
96. H.R. 3077, 108th Cong. §§ 2, 4 (2003).
97. Hoekstra Press Release, supra note 95.
98. H.R. 3077, 108th Cong. § 6 (2003). H.R. 3077 creates a new Section 633 and provides in
part:
Purpose. -The purpose of the International Advisory Board is(A) to provide expertise in the area of national needs for proficiency in world
regions, foreign languages, and international affairs;
(B) to make recommendations that will promote the excellence of international
education programs and result in the growth and development of such programs at
the postsecondary education level that will reflect diverse perspectives and the
full range of views on world regions, foreign languages, and international affairs;
and
(c) to advise the Secretary and the Congress with respect to needs for expertise in
government, the private sector, and education in order to enhance America's
understanding of, and engagement in, the world.
Id.
99. Id. (quoting from proposed § 632(c)(1)).
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studies," and more friendly to American foreign and military policy
overseas. 100

The potential for abuse by such a board is clear, and the proposal has
raised a correlate hue and cry among university Middle East
programs.10 1 University of Michigan Middle-East specialist Juan Cole,
for instance, argues that the board is a recipe for politically-motivated
harassment: "I could imagine the board making it a criterion that the
politics of a faculty are not balanced, so the university must balance
things out by hiring pro-Likud scholars, or else funding could be
withdrawn."' 1 2 Lisa Anderson, Dean of The University of Columbia's
School of International and Public Affairs, notes that the "potential for
abuse" is all the more salient given that the proposed advisory board
answerable either to
would be staffed by political appointees directly
10 3
Congressional party leaders or security agencies.
Congress did not explicitly cite Grutter as an authority for its power
to authorize political oversight of universities. However, Grutter,
decided three months before H.R. 3077 was introduced, makes the legal
case for Congressional power to do so more conceptually
plausible-since Congress justified the proposed advisory board based
on the same "viewpoint" diversity arguments that proved so successful
in Grutter. For example, during debate on the House floor, Rep.
Howard Berman (D-CA), a member of the House International
Relations Committee, argued that the board does not impinge on
academic freedom, because it is designed to expand student exposure to
"viewpoint" diversity and to eliminate a monopoly of narrow views "at
odds with our national interest. ' ' 1°4 Similarly, Rep. John Boehner (ROH) claimed that the bill will "strengthen and renew higher education"
by simultaneously expanding diversity of viewpoints and addressing a
"critical piece of our national efforts to fulfill national and international
100. See Michelle Goldberg, Osama University?, SALON.COM (Nov. 6, 2003), at
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2003/11/06/middle-east/print.html (discussing viewpoints on
potential government intervention in Middle Eastern studies programs at American Universities
from the perspectives of its supporters, in conservative think tanks, and opposition in academia).
101. See Center for International Studies at the University of Chicago, Title VI
Reauthorization Information, at http://internationalstudies.uchicago.edu/titleVI.shtml (last
updated Apr. 6, 2004).
102. Goldberg, supra note 100, at T 13.
103. See Todd Gitlin, Culture War, Round 3077, AMERICAN PROSPECT, Jan. 2004, at 65,
available at http://www.prospect.org/web/printfriendly-view.ww?id=6981 (quoting Anderson on
opposing the use of political appointees to direct Middle East studies curriculum). "[W]e who
have seen precisely that impulse distort and debilitate scholarship, research and education in the
Middle East, know that it will tarnish our image around the world and do serious harm to the
enterprise of higher education in the United States." Id. at 67.
104. 149 CONG. REC. H9752 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 2003) (statement of Rep. Berman).
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security needs."
Grutter makes that argument more compelling. On one view, Grutter
suggests that the government's "national security" interest in military
recruitment is speech related and that the government therefore may
have a "compelling" interest in regulating contribution to "viewpoint"
diversity in a law school-where the vast majority of students will go
on to practice civilian law for large corporate clients. If that is true,
then surely Congress also has the power to monitor, and indirectly
regulate, the "diversity" of viewpoints presented in programs that
provide government specialists for the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), the Pentagon, the National Security Council (NSC) and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). 10 6 After all, the connection
between diversity, training, and security in the latter context assuredly is
no less attenuated than the connection between civilian law school
pedagogy and the distribution of "viewpoint" diversity and "security"
recognized in Grutter.
Even if one takes a narrow view of Grutter's national security
rationale, and assumes it is not directly "speech"-related, it is a small
step from Grutter's suggestion that both national security and
educational pedagogy require "diversity" on campus, to the proposition
that viewpoint diversity on campus is of interest to the government and
therefore a subject for legislation.
To be sure, the First Amendment imposes some scrutiny on the
government's attempts to manipulate university curricula through
funding restraints. 10 7 Yet the limits on government use of the federal
spending power to regulate speech in the university are ill-defined. In
conditional funding cases, while precedents are few, courts have
demonstrated a pronounced tendency to defer to asserted government
interests and to eschew close scrutiny of the means-end fit between the
asserted government interest and the government regulation.10 8 In the

105. 149 CONG. REC. H9752 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 2003) (statement of Rep. Boehner).
106. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003) (quoting to Military Brief that a
"diverse officer corps ... is essential to the military's ability to fulfill its principle [sic] mission to
provide national security," and noting that the military cannot achieve a diverse officer corps
unless the service academies and the country's other most selective institutions are diverse).
107. See FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269, 301-10 (D.N.J. 2003) (analyzing conditional funding
under the First Amendment).
108. See, e.g., Byron V. Olsen, Note, Rust in the Laboratory: When Science is Censored, 58
ALB. L. REV. 299, 332-35 (1994) (noting that courts have proven reticent to apply traditional
"prior restraint" analysis in the context of conditional funding restraints). The prior restraint
doctrine prohibits the placement of any restraint upon the dissemination of a publication before it
has been published. Id. at 332.
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trial court decision in FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 10 9 for example, a New Jersey
district court reasoned that a lesser degree of First Amendment scrutiny
applies in cases where (1) the funding restrictions do not serve to
exclude a particular viewpoint from campus; and (2) the recipient can
avoid the restrictions by rejecting funding. 110 In such circumstances,
said the court, intermediate scrutiny, which requires only a showing that
the burden imposed on speech is necessary to promote a substantial
government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the
regulation, is necessary.11 1 When applicable, the intermediate scrutiny
test is relatively easy to meet, even in the absence of an asserted
government justification based on "national security": so long as when
an interest is identified as substantial, it is not hard to show that a
purported legislation would serve that interest more, rather than less,
effectively. Grutter-by suggesting an asserted nexus between military
training and the distribution of "viewpoint" diversity among "elite"
civilian students 112 -therefore may help to suggest that government
may have a substantial interest in campus speech, and that government
attempts to promote campus diversity may achieve that interest "more
effectively." Grutter accordingly makes the case for H.R. 3077 more,
not less, plausible.
109. FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269 (D.N.J. 2003). See supra Part III.B.2.b.i (discussing the FAIR
case).
110. See FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 302, 311. The district court noted that the funding
restriction did "not silence a particular ... point of view," id. at 302, and did not even constitute a
direct "regulatory restriction" of speech, as when an institution is "required" to accept an
unwanted person. Id. at 311. Rather, it constituted a mere "exercise of congressional spending
power" that left a school with a choice. Id. The Court reasoned the amendment is therefore an
"indirect" or "incidental" regulation. See id. at 311 & n. 9 (stating that because a spending
condition is not akin to a "requirement," it is an "indirect" regulation properly analyzed under
intermediate scrutiny). The district court also reasoned that the Solomon Amendment was
"indirect" because it burdened expressive conduct-not speech. Id. at 312.
111. Id. at 311 & n.9 (equating "exercise of the congressional spending power" with
"indirect" regulation, and holding intermediate scrutiny, under United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 377 (1968), therefore applies. The Third Circuit disagreed with the district court's analysis,
reasoning that (1) that Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000), requires deference to
an expressive association's characterization of its expressive interests, and (2) that the Solomon
Amendment is a direct restriction of the associational interests articulated by the law schools.
Fair v. Rumsfeld, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 24598, at 28-29, 61. The dissent, by contrast, argued that
the Third Circuit had misapplied Dale, and that O'Brien provided the proper, intermediate
standard of review because non-speech conduct (recruiting) was at issue. Id. at 113-15 (Aldisert,
J., dissenting). The Third Circuit's decision has already been criticized by commentators. See,
e.g., Michael C. Doff, A Federal Appeals Court Rules that Universities Can Bar Military
Recruiters Without Losing Grant Money: A Welcome Result Based on Flawed Reasoning,
available at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20041208.html. (last visited Dec. 10, 2004). At
press time, the Department of Justice had not sought certiorari, and the scope of scrutiny in
conditional funding cases remains unsettled among the circuits.
112. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003).
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IV. A CONTRARIAN'S POST-GRU7TER NOTES ON BROWN
What critical conclusions about Brown, if any, should we draw from
Grutter? While Grutter is at best suggestive, the case is at least
consistent with three propositions about Brown's policy-based method
of equal protection analysis: (1) that the Court's use of policy rationales
to justify equal protection rulings is expansionary; (2) that equal
protection analysis may tend to make policy rationales more salient, and
therefore more precedentially powerful; and (3) the expansion of policy
rationales in one area of constitutional law may pose unexpected risks to
parallel right-regimes.
A. Policy Expansion
Grutter suggests that policy rationales articulated in the realm of
"equal protection" may have a tendency to expand from the specific to
the general in succeeding decisions. Consider Brown v. Board of
Education. In Brown, the Warren Court focused primarily on the
individualized effects of segregation on the educational performance of
school children, and relied on extra-legal evidence confined to the realm
of academic social science. 113 In particular, the Court noted that
segregation degraded the quality of educational performance that
individual children received and imposed burdens on individual
children's participation as full citizens. 14 Fifty years later in Grutter,
Justice O'Connor announced a policy rationale that focuses not on the
needs of the individual, but on the needs of the nation. Rather than
assess the effect of a challenged racial classification on individualized
school performance as the Warren Court did in Brown, the Grutter
majority focuses on the effect of the classification on "national
security," effective national "leadership," and "productive" competition
in a global economy. 115 In the process, Grutter has moved from a
relatively specific to a relatively diffuse level of abstraction. That move
is more favorable to judicial discretion. 116 Each of these asserted
113. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 & n. 11 (1954) (citing a series of social science
surveys and studies).
114. Id. at 493-94.
A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the
sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the education and mental
development of negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would
receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system.
Id. (alteration in original).
115. Grutter,539 U.S. at 330-33.
116. Frank H. Easterbrook, Levels of Generality in ConstitutionalInterpretation:Abstraction
and Authority, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 349, 355 (1992) ("Boosting the level of generality ... can be a
method of liberating judges from rules.") (emphasis in original).
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national policy benchmarks is so abstract and bears such a complex and
causally attenuated relationship to any given educational policy that
there is little remaining legal restraint on the discretion of courts in the
realm of equal protection and education. Furthermore, the Court has
provided very little guidance for educators or, for that matter, individual
citizens about the scope of protections afforded by the Equal Protection
Clause.
B. PrecedentialSalience
The Court's use of Grutter as a precedent in First Amendment cases
like FAIR v. Rumsfeld suggests a second feature of policy-based equal
protection decision-making: its precedential salience. FAIR is
suggestive of what common sense tells us must be true: Important equal
protection cases that intersect with race have a unique visibility in the
realm of constitutional law. In the case of Grutter, the decision
warranted nearly 1,200 articles in the popular press in 2003 alone--far
more than the other widely reported cases in the October 2002 Term,
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Campbell,'17 a case of
great interest to corporate defendants involving due process limits on
punitive damages, and Eldred v. Ashcroft, 118 a landmark ruling on the
scope of the Copyright Clause. 119 At the same time, Grutter-the first
Court case to uphold affirmative action in twenty-five years-has been
feted, especially by academics, like few Court decisions are feed.12°
117. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
118. Eldred v.Ashcroft, 538 U.S. 186 (2003).
119. A LEXIS-NEXIS search of all articles discussing Grutter v. Bollinger, in database
"News, All (English, Full-Text)," using key words GRUTTER AND "SUPREME COURT" and
dates 1/1/03-12/31/03, yields 1182 results. A LEXIS-NEXIS search of all articles discussing
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Campbell, in database "News, All (English, FullText)," using key words STATE FARM W/20 CAMPBELL AND SUPREME COURT AND
PUNITIVE DAMAGE AND DATE IS 2003, yields 281 results). A LEXIS-NEXIS search of all
articles discussing Eldred v. Ashcroft, in database "News, All (English, Full-Text)," using key
words ELDRED W/20 ASHCROFT AND DATE IS 2003, yields 223 results.
120. See, e.g., Lee C. Bollinger, On Grutter and Gratz: Examining "Diversity" in Education:
A Comment on Grutter and Gratz v. Bollinger, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1589, 1590-95 (2003)
(discussing the importance of the Grutter decision, from the perspective of a litigant, and
discussing the impetus for vigorously pursuing this litigation and the legal and publicity strategies
employed to defend university practices designed to promote minority participation and
diversity); Jack Greenberg, On Grutter and Gratz: Examining "Diversity" in Education:
Diversity, the University, and the World Outside, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1610, 1614-17 (2003)
(discussing the social and cultural bases for implementing affirmative action and the need for its
continued implementation and lauding the Grutter majority for its articulation of the fundamental
purposes served by affirmative action policies at prestigious post graduate academic institutions);
Cass R. Sunstein, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Why Grutter Was Correctly Decided,
J.OF BLACKS IN HIGHER EDUC., Autumn 2003, available at http://www.jbhe.com/features/
41_affirmative action-highered.html (last visited June 9, 2004) (criticizing and praising the
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All of this is consistent with our gut instincts: In a nation where race is a
powerful flashpoint, race-centered equal protection cases have a special
resonance, and are debated and discussed far more intensely in the
media than the bulk of other Supreme Court cases.
That is one explanation for why Grutter-an equal protection
case-is cited in FAIR v. Rumsfeld as speech precedent. Visibility and
acclaim translates into precedential power, and precedential power
means that diffuse policy rationales-even ones sketched lightly, or
simply suggested in an impressionistic manner, in a well-known equal
protection case-may take on new life in other contexts far removed
from the facts of the case.
C. Opportunistic Exploitation by Courts and the PoliticalBranches
FAIR v. Rumsfeld and H.R. 3077 suggest a further dimension of
policy-based equal protection analysis: the role that creative litigants
and/or envelope-pushing political branches may play in fleshing out and
adapting loosely articulated policy rationales, that make a bit
appearance in the equal protection realm, to new areas of constitutional
law. To be sure, courts may or may not accept the veteran brief in FAIR
or approve the constitutionality of H.R. 3077, but Grutter-because it is
precedentially salient-may serve as a muse to creative litigants, and
may spark new ideas for ways to justify incursions on academic
freedom in an atmosphere where litigants, courts, and political branches
can be expected to take an especially broad view of "national security."
V.

CONCLUSION

Grutter, in short, suggests some reason to think the policy-based
approach legitimated in Brown-which starts by asking what goals or
policies a particular racial classification promotes-may be
unpredictable, difficult to cabin, and uniquely susceptible to the
problem of unintended consequences, especially for parallel
constitutional protections. If that is true, then policy rationales in equal
protection cases may be a dangerous, volatile quantity. Grutter does not
prove that another mode of analysis might not carry different, but
equally dangerous, risks. But Grutter, at the very least, suggests that
Grutter decision and applauding the Court for "allow[ing] the nations colleges and universities to
take steps ... to ensure that the nation's classrooms are not all White"); Press Release, Joint
Statement of Constitutional Law Scholars, Harvard Civil Rights Project, signed by Erwin
Chemerinksy, Walter Dellinger, Pamela Karlan, Eric Schnapper, Drew Days Il, Richard Fallon,
Kenneth L. Karst, Laurence H. Tribe, Lani Guinier, Frank Michelman, and Mark Tushnet, at
23, 2003)
(June
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/policy/court/michigansc.php
(congratulating the Court on its "ringing endorsement" of affirmative action in higher education).
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there may be good reason-now that the battle over segregation is
safely behind us-to give Brown's policy-based mode of analysis a hard
second look, and to consider anew the virtues of lawyerly application of
the Equal Protection Clause-that is to say, equal protection analysis
that: (1) treats expansive policy arguments as a disfavored basis for
decision; and (2) turns to work-a-day rules and guidelines, grounded in
the text and structure of the Fourteenth Amendment, articulated at a low
level of specificity, designed to cabin discretion, and intended to make
outcomes not only just, but also predictable and fairly uniform.
Unfortunately, Grutter also suggests that even fifty years after Brown
revolutionalized Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence a lawyerly
approach to racial equality is no nearer to realization. As Brown passes
the fifty-year mark that is one reason not for celebration, but for
concern.

